Tuesday, September 12, 2006

The Shift

Facing certain lefthanded power hitters (Jason Giambi and David Ortiz spring to mind), many teams will employ a defensive shift in their infield. All players, to warying degrees, move toward the left field line. Generally, the third baseman stands at or near the traditional location of the shortstop, the shortsop stands at or near the traditional location of the second baseman, the first baseman guards the line (as he normally does), and the second baseman stands in short right field.

Why do they move all three guys?

Since the the tradition locations of the second baseman and shortstop are still being manned, ahy not let them play there? The third baseman can move to short right field and leave everyone else where they are. He's got a strong arm, which is good because he's the farthest from the hitter, so the ball should take longer to get to him. And he's the only guy playing out of position, thus improving the overall quality of the defense.

The shift, as it is being employed in baseball today, seems overly complicated and sub-optimal.

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Hometown Heroes

What the hell?

I was an Expos fan. I remember watching a lot of Expos games over the years.

So now MLB has this Hometown Heroes vote where fans are supposed to select the best player in franchise history for each of the 30 teams. The list for the Washington Nationals is:

Gary Carter
Livan Hernandez
Brian Schneider
Rusty Staub
Jose Vidro

The presence of Carter and la grande Orange signal that this is meant to include players from the days in Monrtreal. But if that's so, how can we possibly justify the inclusion of 3 active players on this list? Where are Tim Raines, Andre Dawson, and Dennis Martinez?

This can't be a legitimate attempt to identify the best players in franchise history, because no reasonable person would choose those guys as the top five (or anything close to the top five). Being a rational agent, I can't begin to guess what the point of this exercise is, but it certainly isn't what they say it is.

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

Halladay's DIPS trend

Since 2002, Roy Halladay's BABIP (batting average on balls in play) has been steadily declining.

2002: .290 BABIP
2003: .286 BABIP
2004: .313 BABIP (injured)
2005: .264 BABIP
2006: .250 BABIP

Is it sustainable? That certainly looks like a trend, though Halladay isn't the sort of pitcher who typically has the ability to keep his BABIP that far from league average (.300). Those pitchers are knuckleballers.

Friday, May 19, 2006

Interleague Play

I think interleague play is stupid. I think it's stupid because there's a wildcard. The unbalanced schedule already makes the wildcard a crap shoot, but interleague play muddies the picture even further. How can we expect a wildcard race between Texas and New York to be credible if their schedules features opponents of significantly different strengths?

But we're stuck with it. So why not give us better "rivalries"? Sure, NY-NY, Dodgers-Angels, and Cubs-ChiSox make a lot of sense. Toronto-Montreal was good, too. But Seattle plays San Diego. Why? Because neither of them has another opponent handy. The same goes for the newly established Toronto-Colorado "rivalry".

What?

Toronto-Colorado? Seriously? Look, pairing up Washington and Baltimore makes a lot of sense, and it's something they should have done last year, but why saddle Toronto with Colorado? Why not Atlanta? Atlanta doesn't have a rival, either (they're playing Arizona this weekend to make the numbers add up), but Toronto-Atlanta would be a rematch of the 1992 World Series. That would be pretty cool.

Tuesday, May 16, 2006

Equivalent Average

Equivalent Average (EqA) is a creation of Clay Davenport over at Baseball Prospectus. I highly recommend him.

EqA is a rate stat designed to measure everything a player does in his team's half of the inning. It's normalised to a scale designed to mimic batting average so as to provide a familiar range of scores. As such, the league average EqA is always .260

The Mariners aren't doing so hot. Minimum 50 PA:

.268 Willie Bloomquist
.267 Raul Ibanez
.267 Carl Everett
.266 Ichiro
.263 Jose Lopez
.259 Kenji Johjima
.251 Yuniesky Betancourt
.249 Adrian Beltre
.245 Jeremy Reed
.244 Richie Sexson

The upside is that only a few of those guys are hitting as well as can be reasonably expected. Lopez, Everett, maybe Ibanez. Betancourt. Everyone else is underperforming. Either something's wrong with them, or they'll improve.

Just for fun, let's compare them to the Jays' EqA numbers - same parameters:

.298 Frank Catalanotto
.294 Vernon Wells
.294 Alexis Rios
.293 Reed Johnson
.285 Greg Zaun
.282 Troy Glaus
.280 Shea Hillenbrand
.274 Lyle Overbay
.271 Eric Hinske
.259 Bengie Molina
.253 Russ Adams
.237 John McDonald
.231 Aaron Hill

First of all, that left field platoon is sick. The only other team getting production like that out of LF, a premium offensive position, is Milwaukee with Carlos Lee. And, there are NINE GUYS performing at a higher rate-based level than anyone on the Mariners. Anyone. Even freaking Eric Hinske (admittedly in a platoon protecting him from lefties) is outperforming all Mariners.

The real story here is that the Mariners can't hit, even worse than anyone thought they wouldn't be able to hit. But those Jays are tending fairly strongly in the other direction.

Monday, May 08, 2006

Smokin' Jays

Compare this to the Mariners below. The Mariners are awful so far this season, but the Jays are doing pretty well (especially the hitters). As before, ranked by runs above average (yes, I'm too lazy to learn how to build tables right now):

+16 Vernon Wells
+13 Alexis Rios
+11 Frank Catalanotto
+07 B.J. Ryan
+07 Troy Glaus
+06 Ted Lilly
+05 Justin Speier
+04 Roy Halladay
+03 Shea Hillenbrand
+03 Eric Hinske
+03 Reed Johnson
+01 Lyle Overbay
+01 Gustavo Chacin
+01 Greg Zaun
+01 Fransisco Rosario
-01 Scott Downs
-01 Jason Phillips
-01 Dustin McGowan
-02 A.J. Burnett
-02 Casey Janssen
-02 Scott Schoeneweis
-03 Shaun Marcum
-03 Wolverine Tallet
-04 Vinnie Chulk
-04 John McDonald
-05 Russ Adams
-06 Jason Frasor
-14 Aaron Hill
-17 Josh Towers

Now that we have neat columns of numbers, we can compare. The total combined RCAA for the Jays' hitters in +34, but their pitchers' RSAA is -17. Toronto total: 17 RAA

The total combined RCAA for Mariners hitters is -29. Ouch. But their pitchers have a combined RSAA of +6. Seattle total: -23 RAA

So the difference is 40 RAA (I have no idea if RCAA and RSAA are park-adjusted - I should find that). For comparison, you'd have to go another 41 RAA down to get to the hapless Royals languishing at -64 combined RAA.

-64 RAA. I think I found Ross Perot's giant sucking sound.

Dreadful Mariners

Through Saturday, the Seattle Mariners, ranked by Runs Above Average (created or saved, based on whether they're hitters or pitchers):

+5 Jamie Moyer
+5 Joel Pineiro
+5 J.J. Putz
+4 Raul Ibanez
+4 Jarrod Washburn
+3 Rafael Soriano
+2 Roberto Petagine
+1 George Sherrill
-1 Kenji Johjima
-1 Jose Lopez
-2 Joe Borchard
-2 Sean Green
-2 Bobby Livingstone
-2 Clint Nageotte
-2 Ichiro
-2 Jake Woods
-3 Eddie Guardado
-3 Carl Everett
-3 Julio Mateo
-3 King Felix
-6 Yuniesky Betancourt
-6 Richie Sexson
-7 Jeremy Reed
-7 Adrian Beltre

Everyone I didn't list scored a zero - they've been exactly average (congratulations Gil Meche - I never thought I'd see you be average again).

Thursday, May 04, 2006

Hidden Ball Trickster

Mike Lowell.

When the Red Sox acquired Mike Lowell in the offseason, they acquired the last man to have successfully executed the hidden ball trick in the major leagues, and the only one to do it since J.T. Snow in 1999.

And he's done it twice. Lowell tricked Brian Schneider in 2004, and Luis Terrero in 2005.

The hidden ball trick is, by its very nature, clutch. Lowell gets to decide when he's going to try it, and with a guy on third base, its marginal run value is pretty high. Lowell's expertise with the hidden ball trick has real value; it could have significant impact on the AL East race late in the season if he were to catch Johnny Damon a bit too far from third.

Tuesday, May 02, 2006

If it matters, measure it.

Baseball is a great sport for people who like to know what they know (where's Donald Rumsfeld when you need him?). It consists of discrete, measurable events.

And the ability to measure them matters. If the outcome of a decision has no measurable consequences, then the content of that decision is irrelevant. If you can't tell to what extent basestealing affects your chance to win a game, then there's no credible argument on either side of the decision to steal.

So, if you can tell that it matters, it must be measurable. And if it's measureable, and it matters, we should measure it.